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Abstract: This paper develops a model to assess the quantitative effect of entry cost and financial friction 
on cross-country income and total factor productivity (TFP) differences. The main focus is on the 
interaction between entry cost and financial friction. The model is calibrated to match establishment-level 
statistics for the U.S. economy assuming a perfect financial market. The quantitative analysis shows that 
entry costs and financial frictions together can generate a factor ten of the differences in income per 
capita and a factor five of the differences in TFP, and a large part of the differences are accounted for by 
the interaction between entry cost and financial friction. The main mechanism is that financial friction 
amplifies the effect of entry cost by boosting the effective entry cost. 
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Income per capita diers by a factor of thirty between rich and poor countries. Research
on growth accounting nds out that most of the dierences come from the cross-country
dierences in total factor productivity (TFP). 1 On the other hand, many poor countries
have poor developed nancial markets as well as large costs to the opening of new businesses.
Both of these two factors have been found to be negatively correlated with income per capita
across country.2 The goal of this paper is to quantify the importance of nancial frictions
and entry costs for cross-country dierences in income per capital and TFP.
There are a number of studies that have examined either the eects of nancial frictions
or the eects of entry costs on cross-country dierences. The objective of this paper is
to investigate whether there is any interaction between entry costs and nancial frictions
and how such interaction may aect cross-country income and TFP dierences. Intuitively,
underdeveloped nancial markets may amplify the eect of entry cost since entrepreneurs
can not borrow to overcome the high barriers. In contrast, better developed nancial market
may have little eects on how entry costs aect output and TFP.
To explore this issue, this paper develops a model to incorporate both nancial friction
and entry cost, and then use the calibrated model to explore how the eect of entry cost
on cross-country income and TFP dierences change with nancial market conditions. We
discover that nancial friction amplies the eect of entry cost on economic development.
Moreover, the interaction between nancial friction and entry cost is quantitatively important
in accounting for the cross-country income and TFP dierences.
The model developed in this paper builds on the industry model studied by Hopenhayn
1See for example Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), Prescott (1998), Hall and Jones (1999). One
exception is Manuelli and Seshadri (2005)
2Djankov et. al. (2002) nds a negative correlation between GDP per capita and the ratio of entry cost
to GDP per capita. Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) and (2006) nd that entry cost is negatively related
to TFP in OECD countries. Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) established a negative relationship between
nancial development and economic growth.(1992) and Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993). In the model establishments have dierent
levels of productivity and the technology is subject to decreasing return to scale with a xed
production cost. We assume that capital and labor have to be paid before production takes
place. An establishment can save or borrow from the nancial market to fulll the need for
working capital. The nancial market is imperfect and an establishment can only borrow
up to a fraction of its expected discounted life-time prots. The existing establishments
may exit if it is hit by a death shock or the value of production is smaller than the savings.
In contrast, new establishments can enter after paying an upfront entry cost which can be
borrowed from the nancial market subject to a similar borrowing constraint facing by the
existing establishments.
The model is calibrated to match the establishment level statistics in the U.S. economy
assuming a perfect nancial market for the U.S. The calibrated model is then used to analyze
the cross-country dierences in income per capita and TFP. To perform the analysis, we vary
entry costs in the range observed in the data and vary the friction in the nancial market to
obtain variations in external nance to GDP ratios that are comparable to the data. We nd
that entry costs and nancial frictions together can account for a factor ten of the dierences
in income per capita and a factor ve of the dierences in TFP across countries. Moreover,
a large part of the explanatory power comes from the interaction between entry cost and
nancial friction.
The intuition for the results consists of three parts. First, higher entry costs lead to
less entry and therefore a smaller number of productive establishments. This reduces the
competitive pressure in the economy. Hence establishments with a lower productivity can
survive and output and TFP decrease. Second, when there are nancial frictions, the existing
establishment can not borrow enough working capital and has to operate at a scale smaller
than the ecient level. Third, nancial friction amplies the eects of entry cost on output
and TFP. To understand this, note that when there are frictions in the nancial market,
1some of the protable entrants may not be able to open their businesses since they can
not nance the required upfront entry cost. This reduces the number of establishments in
production. The eect is equivalent to an increase in the entry cost. Hence output and
TFP fall. Furthermore, as nancial market condition deteriorates, the amplication eect
becomes larger, so does the drop in output and TFP.
This paper is connected to the literature that studies the relationship between vari-
ous policies and the cross-country income and TFP dierences. For instance, Parente and
Prescott (1999) and Herrendorf and Texeira (2010) examines the role of monopoly rights
in blocking the use of most ecient technologies. Lagos (2006) examines how labor market
institutions aect TFP. Erosa and Hidalgo (2008) investigates the role of poor contract en-
forcement in explaining the use of inecient technologies and low TFP in poor countries.
Guner et al. (2008) and Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) studies the eects of size-dependent
policies on macroeconomic aggregates. D'Erasmo and Moscoso Boedo (2010) explores how
the cost to informality and nancial market structure aects cross-country TFP dierences.
This paper is more closely related to three other papers in the literature that empha-
size the importance of entry costs and nancial frictions on cross-country income and TFP
dierences. Barseghyan and DiCecio (2009) quanties the eect of entry cost on economic de-
velopment. Amaral and Quintin (2009) and Buera et al. (2009) show that nancial frictions
can generate sizable dierences in output and TFP. We view this paper as a complement
to these works. We develop an industry model incorporating both entry cost and nancial
friction. The model allows us to investigate how the interaction between entry costs and
nancial frictions aects income and TFP dierences. Moreover, the simulations based on
the calibrated model show that the interaction is quantitatively important.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
lays out the agents' maximization problem and denes the steady state equilibrium. Section
4 describes the calibration strategy. Section 5 assesses the quantitative implications of the
2calibrated model and the robustness of the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Economy
We consider a discrete-time model with heterogeneity in establishment level productivity.
The model can be best described as embedding borrowing constraints into the industry
model studied by Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993). In the model economy an establishment
needs to pay for capital and labor ahead of production. To nance the working capital, the
establishment can either use its savings or borrow from an imperfect nancial market. More
importantly, there are many potential entrants who can enter after paying a front-loaded
set-up cost upon entry and this cost also needs to be nanced.
2.1 Household
There is an innitely-lived representative household that inelastically supply one unit of





where 0 <  < 1 is the discount factor and u is an increasing and concave function in ct.
The household invests and rents capital to establishments and owns all the establishments
in the economy.
2.2 Production
The production unit is the establishment. There are a continuum of existing establishments
which dier in their productivity z. Each of them hires labor, rents capital, and produces





To simplify the analysis, we deviate from Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and assume that
z is constant over an establishment's life. This assumption does not aect the analysis
of the interaction between entry costs and nancial market frictions, but saves a lot of
computational time.3 The establishment's production technology is assumed to be decreasing
return to scale, i.e., +
 < 1. To stay in operation, each establishment needs to pay a xed
production cost f every period, measured in the units of output.
We assume that capital and labor need to be paid before production takes place. An
establishment can nance the working capital either through its savings s or through bor-
rowing from the nancial market. To save, an establishment must have positive current
period prots. If the savings can not cover the capital and labor costs, the establishment
can borrow from the nancial market at a constant rate rb and can not default on the debt.
We assume that borrowing and capital rental are both within period.
The nancial market is imperfect and each establishment can borrow up to a fraction
 of its discounted life-time prots.  captures the degree of nancial frictions in dierent
countries with the interpretation that a larger  represents a better nancial market. Al-
though the credit constraint is not derived from an optimal contract, it imposes an upper
bound on borrowing and captures the idea that more protable establishments can borrow
more from the nancial market. In fact, an optimal contract often gives rise to a similar
credit constraint.4
At the beginning of a period, each establishment faces an exogenous probability of death
. If an establishment is hit by the death shock, it keeps its savings and exits. Moreover, an
3See section 5.2 for details.
4see for example Chen and Song (2009) and Amaral and Quintin (2009).
4establishment can choose to exit endogenously if the continuation value is smaller than its
savings.
The timing of decisions within a period is as follows. At the beginning of a period,
the death shock realizes. The survival establishment then decides whether to stay or exit.
If the establishment decides to stay, it chooses how much labor to hire and how much
capital to rent, and therefore how much to borrow from the nancial market taking into
account the borrowing constraints. At the end of the period, production takes place and the
establishment repays the debt and decides how much to save.
There are also a continuum of innite amount of ex ante identical entrants which can
enter each period after paying the entry cost fe. fe represents a nominal cost of entry and
the revenue will be rebated back to the household in a lump-sum fashion. To pay such
costs, the entrant can borrow from the nancial market at the rate rb up to the fraction 
of its value of entry. The debt is again within period and has to be repaid at the end of
the period. Once the entry cost is paid, each establishment receives a productivity draw z
from the distribution F(z). The productivity draws are i.i.d across entering establishments
and the distribution F(z) is the same every period. After the productivity draw is realized,
the entering establishment with productivity z is in the same position as an incumbent that
has the same productivity and savings  fe, and has survived the death shock, and therefore
decides to stay or exit rst and if it chooses to stay, then decides how much to borrow, how
much to produce, and how much to save.
3 Equilibrium
This section focuses on the stationary equilibrium for the economy just described. In such
an equilibrium, all the prices are constant and the distribution of establishments over pro-
ductivity and savings does not change over time.
5Household
Normalize the price of the consumption good to be one and let W(K) denote the value
function of the household. The problem of the representative household is then given by:
W(K) = max
c;K0 u(c) + W(K
0)
s:t: c + K
0   (1   )K = w + rkK +  + T; (3.1)
where  is the depreciation rate, w is the wage, rk is the rental rate on capital, T is transfers,
and  is the prots generated by the productive establishments.
A simple manipulation of the rst order condition implies that if a stationary equilibrium




  (1   ): (3.2)
Establishment
Let v(z;s) be the value function of an establishment with productivity z and savings s









0] + (1 + rb)s
0
s:t: wh + rkk   s  v(z;s) (3.3)
s
0 = 0;if zkh





   (1 + rb)(wh + rkk   s)   f;otherwise (3.4)
where wh + rkk   s is the working capital that the establishment nances externally and
s0 denotes next period's value of savings. The maximization operator that nested on the
6right hand side re
ects the establishment's decision of staying or exiting at the beginning
of the next period. An establishment's value consists of its current period prot, which is
given by zkh
   (1 + rb)(wh + rkk   s) net of the xed cost f and savings s0, and the
next period's value, which re
ects the realization of the death shock and the establishment's
staying or exiting decision. (3.3) describes the borrowing constraint and (3.4) summarizes
the assumption that the establishment's savings must come from nonnegative prots.
Since there is no distortion in the capital market and the labor market, the rst order
condition for k and h implies that capital-labor ratio k
h is constant across establishments








Moreover, if the nancial market is perfect, (3.3) will not bind, and all the establishments



















































However, if the nancial market is imperfect, (3.3) may bind, and therefore some, if not all
productive establishments can not borrow enough working capital and will operate below
their optimal scales. In this case k and h will be increasing in s since more savings not
only imply that the establishment has more internal fund to nance working capital, but
also imply that the establishment can borrow more from the nancial market because v
is an increasing function of s. This and several other properties of the value function are
established in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (i) v(z;s) is strictly increasing in z and s;
7(ii) v(z;s)   s(1 + rb) is increasing in s.
Proof: See appendix.
Since v is increasing in z, the decision of staying or exiting is characterized by a cuto
rule for z at a given value of s. In particular, the rule is to exit if z is smaller than the cuto
value and to stay otherwise. Moreover, Lemma 1(ii) proves that an increase in s leads to a
larger increase in v. This implies that the decision of staying or exiting is also characterized
by a cuto rule for s at a given value of z. Since v is increasing in z, it is easy to see that
the cuto value of s becomes smaller as z increases. In addition, the cuto rule implies that
if an entrant decides to stay in operation in the period of entry, it will choose to stay every
period afterwards until the death shock realizes because its productivity z is constant over
time and its savings will be larger than that in the period of entry.
Entry
As in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), since there are innite amount of potential en-
trants each period, the value of entry for an entering establishment should not exceed the
entry cost in the equilibrium when the nancial market is perfect. In this economy the
entrant is in the same position as the existing establishment with the same productivity and
savings  fe, and therefore when making stay/exit decision, the entrant will compare between
v(z; fe) and  fe(1 + rb).5 Hence the free entry condition can be described as follows:
fe +
Z
max(v(z; fe); fe(1 + rb))dF(z)  fe; (3.8)
where the fe on the left hand side is the amount borrowed from the nancial market and the
fe on the right hand side denotes the entry cost. The integral is taken over all the possible
productivity draws. For future reference, note that the left hand side of (3.8) denotes the
value of entry for a new establishment.
5If fe  v(z; fe), we assume that the entrant can not nance any working capital and therefore can
not produce in the period of entry.
8If there is no nancial friction, the free entry condition (3.8) must hold in the steady
state equilibrium. In fact, in such cases (3.8) must holds with equality. This is true because
 fraction of productive establishments exits exogenously every period. Hence if a steady
state equilibrium exists, there must be positive entry and exits. In such an equilibrium, if
(3.8) does not hold with equality, more establishments will enter and produce. This drives
down the value of entry until it is no longer protable for more establishments to enter.
However when there is nancial friction, free entry condition may not hold in the steady
state equilibrium. To see this, note that similar to an existing establishment, a new estab-
lishment can only borrow up to  fraction of its value of entry. Hence if fe is less than the
borrowing limit for a potential entrant, no establishment can pay the up-front cost to enter.
In such cases, a steady state equilibrium can not exist even when the free entry condition
holds, since if a steady state equilibrium exists, there must be a positive amount of entry.
This implies that fe must be less than or equal to the borrowing limit for a new establish-
ment in the steady state equilibrium. Since the left of (3.8) is the value of entry for a new
establishment, the borrowing constraint is simply as follows:6
ffe +
Z








If   1, there is no contradiction between (3.8) and (3.10), and therefore free entry
6Alternatively, the borrowing constraint for a new establishment can be based on the net value of
entry. In this case (3.10) changes to f
R
max(v(z; fe); fe(1 + rb))dF(z)g  fe. Hence the free en-
try condition holds only if  = inf or fe = 0. Simple manipulation of this borrowing constraint gives
ffe +
R
max(v(z; fe); fe(1 + rb))dF(z)g 
fe(1+)
 . Hence the eective entry cost is
fe(1+)
 , which is
larger than the eective entry cost in the case when the borrowing constraint is based on the gross value of
entry. This implies that the amplication eects of nancial frictions on entry cost will be even larger if the
net value of entry is used to form the borrowing constraint.
9condition will hold with equality in the equilibrium. This implies that if the friction in the
nancial market is moderate, all the protable new establishments can borrow fe and the
entry decision is not distorted. However, if  < 1, the entry decision is distorted and the
free entry condition can not hold in the equilibrium. In such cases the entrant's borrowing
constraint (3.10) binds. This is true since when the free entry condition does not hold, it
is protable for more establishments to enter. In addition, these establishments can acquire
the up-front cost fe from the nancial market if the borrowing constraint does not bind.
This drives up the wage rate, and therefore drives down the value of entry until (3.10) holds
with equality. It follows that if   1, nancial friction does not distort the entry decision,
however if  < 1, nancial friction not only distorts the production scale, but also distorts
the entry decision.
For future reference, note that from (3.8) and (3.10), it is easy to see that when   1,
the value of entry equals to the entry cost fe, but when  < 1, the value of entry equals
to
fe
 . Thus, when  < 1,
fe
 can be viewed as the eective entry cost since the entrants
make entry decision according to
fe
 instead of fe, and therefore output and TFP also adjust
according the eective entry cost. Hence, as long as  is small, even if the entry cost is
not large, the eective entry cost could still be large. This implies that nancial friction
interacts with entry cost and amplies the eects of entry cost on cross-country incomes and
TFP dierences by boosting the eective entry cost. Moreover, the severer the friction is,
the larger the amplication eect is.
Aggregation
Let (z;s) denote the distribution of productive establishments across productivity and
savings. Let x(z;s) denote the decision of staying or exiting with the convention that
x(z;s) = 1 corresponds to stay and x(z;s) = 0 corresponds to exit. Let M be the mass
of entrants, S be the aggregate savings, 
 be the total net interest payment, and Y be the
aggregate output. Let k(z;s), h(z;s), and s0(z;s) be the optimal decision for capital, labor,
10and savings. The relation between establishment level variables and aggregate variables can

















In the steady state equilibrium, the current period savings also equals to S, which includes
savings of productive establishments, exiting establishments, and dead establishments. With
the denition for aggregate capital, labor, output, and savings at hand, the total net interest
payment and total prot can then be dened as follows:

 = rb(w + rkK) + rbMfe   rbS; (3.15)
 = Y   (w + rkK)(1 + rb)  
Z
fd + (1 + rb)S  
Z
s
0(z;s)d   Mfe(1 + rb); (3.16)
where (w+rkK)(1+rb) is the total cost of working capital and Mfe(1+rb) is the total cost
of entry. The government balances budgets each period:
T = Mfe: (3.17)
The goods market clear condition is standard once the nancing cost 
 is taken into account:




113.1 Denition of the Steady State Equilibrium
A steady state competitive equilibrium is composed of: prices w and rk, value functions
W(K) and v(z;s), a measure of establishments (z;s), a mass of entry M, consumption c
and aggregate capital K, and policy functions h(z;s), k(z;s), s0(z;s), and x(z;s) such that:
(i) Given prices, all agents solve their maximization problems.
(ii) The resource constraints (3.11) to (3.18) hold.
(iii) If   1, (3.8) holds with equality and if  < 1, (3.10) holds with equality.
(iv)  is time-invariant.
4 Calibration
This section calibrates the parameters in order to match observations in the steady state to
the data in the U.S. For this purpose, the U.S is treated as an economy without distortion in
the nancial market.7 We assume that one period in the model corresponds to one year in the
data and target the steady state interest rate rb to be 4% a year. This implies that  = 0:96.
To calibrate the exogenous exit rate , we target the exit rate of 10% for the establishments
in the U.S. We follow the literature and set the return to scale in the establishment level to
be 0.8, and set capital share to be 1
3 and labor share to be 2
3 of the return to scale parameter
respectively.8 This implies that  = 0:267 and 
 = 0:533. To calibrate the depreciation rate,
we target the capital output ratio in the U.S. economy to be 2.3. In the economy without
nancial friction, the payment to capital is rk(1 + rb)K = Y . This and (3.2) then implies
 = 0:0715.
We assume a lognormal distribution F(z) with support [0;zmax] for the initial productiv-
7The nancial market in the U.S. is certainly not perfect. Hence, the quantitative results in section 5
should be interpreted as the eects of nancial frictions on income and TFP relative to the U.S.
8The return to scale parameter is found to be between 0.8 and 0.9. See for example Basu (1996), Veracierto
(2001), Chang (2008) and Guner et. al. (2008). Section 5.2 reports the results for the return to scale of 0.85
and 0.9.
12ity draw of a new establishment. In the economy without nancial friction, all establishments
operate at their optimal scale and the establishment level employment is uniquely determined
by z for any given prices. Hence zmax can be pin down by the maximum establishment level
employment in the steady state equilibrium, which we assume to be 10,000.
The parameters that remain to be assigned are the entry cost fe, the xed production
cost f, and the mean a and the variance  of the distribution F. We calibrate these four
parameters jointly to match the ratio of entry cost to income per capita, the average es-
tablishment size, and the share of total number of establishments at dierent size in the
U.S. economy. The Doing Business data set of the World Bank provides the data about
entry cost in terms of income per capita in 184 countries since 2004. The average value
for the U.S. from 2004 to 2010 is 0.73%. This number is used to pin down the entry cost
fe. The establishment level statistics are borrowed from the 2007 U.S. Economic Census,
which summarizes the establishment level distributional statistics by size. Specically, the
targets include 10 moments: the average establishment size and nine statistics related to the
distribution of the share of establishments by size.
The calibrated parameters are reported in table 1. Table 2 lists the targets and the
corresponding statistics generated by the model. Overall, the calibrated model matches the
data well.
5 Quantitative Analysis
This section uses the calibrated model to assess the eects of entry cost, nancial friction,
and the interaction between them on the cross-country income and TFP dierences. The
strategy is to compare the steady state equilibrium in economies that dier in the entry cost
and the ability of acquiring external nance. According to data for entry cost to per capita
GDP ratio from the World Bank and data for per capita GDP from the Penn World Table,
13the maximum amount of entry cost in the data is about 20 times of the U.S. level. Hence
for the comparison exercises we increase the entry cost from the benchmark value to twenty
times.
When assessing the eects of nancial friction, we vary  to obtain a range of external
nance to GDP ratios observed in the data. The data we use is the private sector credit to
GDP ratio from the World Development Indicators, published by the World Bank. For the
analysis, we examine four dierent levels of external debt to GDP ratios. The four levels
correspond to the average external debt to GDP ratios in high income countries, middle
income countries, low income countries, and poor countries, where the denition of the four
groups follow the denition of the World Bank. The calibrated values for  are listed in table
3.
Following the standard development accounting exercise, total factor productivity in this




where H is one since the labor supply is inelastic.
5.1 Results
Figure 2 plots the steady state output and TFP against the entry cost for dierent values
of . For comparison purpose, all values are relative to the U.S. To isolate the eects of the
interaction between entry costs and nancial frictions, gure 1 plots similar results for the
economy without distortion on business entry. In this economy, borrowing constraints are
only imposed on the nance of working capital and not on the nance of entry costs. This
implies that free entry condition (3.8) holds with equality regardless of the value for . For
the simulations in gure 1, we choose the same values for fe and  as in gure 2. Since
whether the borrowing constraint is imposed on business entry or not is irrelevant for the
14economy without nancial frictions, the top curves in both gure 1 and gure 2 are identical.
Figure 1 relates to several works in the literature. To begin with, the top curves, which can
be related to Barseghyan and DiCecio (2009), shows how output and TFP varies with entry
costs in an economy with perfect nancial market. As Barseghyan and DiCecio (2009), when
the entry cost increases, both output and TFP decreases. The intuition behind this result is
simple. When there is no nancial friction, free entry condition always needs to be satised
in the steady state equilibrium. A higher entry cost then necessarily leads to higher expected
value of entry through a lower wage rate. This implies a larger v for any pair of (z;s), and
therefore establishments with a smaller productivity can survive and the cuto value for z
decreases. Moreover, a larger entry cost also reduces the mass of production establishments.
Both of these two reasons lead to lower output and TFP. As gure 1 indicates, varying entry
cost from the U.S. level to twenty times can generate about two and a half times of the
dierences in output and about twice of the dierences in TFP.
Figure 1 can also be related to Amaral and Quintin (2009) and Buera et al. (2009) once
the entry cost is xed at the U.S. level. As in these works, tighter borrowing constraints
decrease output and TFP since tighter borrowing constraints reduce establishments' produc-
tion scale and distort the allocation of capital and labor. However the quantitative eects is
much smaller here. To understand this, note that Amaral and Quintin (2009) has a three pe-
riod over-lapping generations model in which the entrepreneurs can only save for one period
and can not overcome borrowing constraints through self-nancing over time. As a result,
the quantitative eects of nancial friction is large. Buera et al. (2009) generates a larger
eect through an industry model with risk averse entrepreneurs and misallocation of capital
and talent. In contrast, we did not model the misallocation of talent, and show that the
misallocation of capital and labor with risk neutral establishments can not generate a large
quantitative eect of nancial friction on output and TFP. This abstraction simplies the
analysis and does not undermine our results since our main focus is on how the interaction
15between entry cost and nancial market friction aects the cross-country income and TFP
dierences.
Now we turn to the main results. From gure 2, when we take into account the borrowing
constraint on business entry, nancial friction decreases output and TFP a lot more for any
level of entry cost. To understand this, note that  is less than one for all the curves
except the top ones in gure 2. Hence the free entry condition (3.8) can not be satised in
these economies, and instead (3.10) holds with equality. In such cases, the equilibrium wage
rate adjusts according to the eective entry cost
fe
 , so do the output and TFP. Because
 < 1, the reduction in output and TFP will be larger comparing to the economy with
the same fe and  but without borrowing constraint on business entry. This implies that
nancial friction interacts with entry cost and amplies the eects of entry cost on output
and TFP. Furthermore, as the nancial market condition deteriorates, such amplication
eect becomes larger, since a smaller  leads to larger eective entry costs.
In the context of this model the interaction between entry cost and nancial friction is
generated by the borrowing constraints on business entry, which largely exists in reality.
When business entry is explicitly modeled, such constraints imply that some of the prof-
itable entrants may not be able to borrow the required up-front entry cost to open their
businesses. Hence nancial frictions aect output and TFP not only through reducing the
existing establishments' production scale, but also through reducing the mass of the enter-
ing establishments directly. As a result, the number of production establishments falls. In
addition, less entry also decreases the competitive pressure on the existing establishments.
Thus, establishments with lower productivity and savings can survive. This all leads to lower
output and TFP. As the nancial market condition deteriorates, it becomes even harder for
new businesses to open, and therefore the distortion becomes larger and output and TFP
fall more.
Next we turn to the quantitative magnitude of the eects. Based on gure 2, the maxi-
16mum dierences on output the model can generate is a factor of ten. As in the data, most of
the dierences are accounted by the dierences in TFP. In particular, the model can generate
a factor ve of the dierences in TFP across countries. Once we shut down the interaction
between entry costs and nancial frictions, the maximum dierences the model can generate
are a factor of two and a half for output and a factor of two for TFP as shown in gure 1.
This implies that the interaction between entry costs and nancial frictions accounts for a
large part of the quantitative eects and the size of such quantitative eects are comparable
to the size of the quantitative eects in the case without the interaction. Hence when ana-
lyzing the eects of nancial frictions and entry costs on output and TFP, it is important
to model business entry explicitly and explore the interaction between them. We did not
model the entrepreneur sector and assume that establishments have zero wealth before entry
and have to nance the entire entry cost. If allowing part of the entry cost paid through
entrepreneurs' savings, the quantitative eects will be smaller than that shown in gure 2
and larger than that shown in gure 1, and the size of the eects depends on nancial friction
and the part of the entry cost needed to be nanced.
It is also worth noting that the shape of the curves in gure 1 does not change much
with . In fact, output and TFP change almost linearly with entry cost in log scale and the
slope is about the same for dierent values of . Such properties are preserved in the cases
with interaction between entry costs and nancial frictions, since the eective entry cost is
a linear function of the actual entry cost for any given .
Next we explore how the capital-output ratio changes in the model. Entry cost does not
aect the capital accumulation, and therefore has no eects on the capital-output ratio. In
contrast, nancial friction does aect the capital accumulation and potentially can aect the
capital-output ratio. In particular, the capital-output ratio falls by about 3% as we change
 from the benchmark level to the level in poor countries. This also contributes to part of
the reduction in output, but the eects are small.
17In summary, entry costs and nancial frictions in the model can generate large cross-
country income and TFP dierences and a large part of the dierences are accounted by the
interaction between entry costs and nancial frictions. Hence such interaction can not be
ignored when analyzing the cross-country income and TFP dierences.
5.2 Discussion
5.2.1 Technology Parameters
This section discuss the robustness of the results to various choices of the parameters. We
rst explore the eects of varying the return to scale parameter, and then investigate the
eects of changing the capital share. To do these experiments, we recalibrate the model to
match the same targets as before. The calibrated parameters are listed in table 4.
We set the return to scale parameter to be 0.8 in the benchmark calibration. Research in
the literature normally nds a value between 0.8 and 0.9. Figure 3 and 4 shows the results
for the return to scale of 0.85 and 0.9 respectively. The top panels plots the results for the
economy without borrowing constraint on business entry and the the lower panels plots the
results for the economy with borrowing constraint on business entry. Although the model
generates a smaller eects as the return to scale parameter increases, the quantitative eects
is still sizeable. More importantly, a large part of the eects again comes from the interaction
between entry cost and nancial friction.
Figure 5 and 6 shows the results for capital share of 0.2 and 0.4 holding the return to
scale parameter constant. The pictures show clearly that the interaction between entry cost
and nancial friction is quantitatively important for cross-country dierences in income and
TFP for reasonable values of capital share.
185.2.2 Evolution of Establishment Level Productivity
The model abstracts from the time-series variation in establishment level productivity and
assumes that productivity is constant over time for a given establishment. If we allow the
establishment level productivity evolves over time according to a rst-order Markov process,
the quantitative eects could be even larger since the uncertainty about future productivity
distorts the decision of savings and therefore distorts the allocation of capital and labor
further in the economy with nancial friction. Moreover, if an establishment has to make
the nance decision before the realization of its current period productivity, the allocation
of capital and labor will be distorted even further. More importantly, the evolution of
establishment level productivity does not change the mechanism through which nancial
frictions amplify the eects of entry costs. Hence the interaction will still be important.
6 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed how the interaction between entry costs and nancial frictions aect
the cross-country income and TFP dierences. To perform such analysis, we developed a
model with both entry costs and nancial frictions. In the model, entry, production, and exit
decisions are all endogenous. To pay for working capital, establishments can save or borrow
from the nancial market. To enter, new establishments have to pay an upfront entry cost
which can also be borrowed from the nancial market. The nancial market is imperfect
and each establishment can only borrow up to a fraction of its expected discounted life-time
prots.
The model is calibrated to match the establishment level statistics in the U.S. economy
assuming a perfect nancial market for the U.S. The simulations show that the model can
generate a factor ten of the dierences in income per capita and a factor ve of the dierences
in TFP across countries, and a large part of the dierences are accounted by the interaction
19between entry cost and nancial friction. The main mechanism is that nancial frictions
amplify the eects of entry costs by boosting the eective entry costs.
We assume that all new establishments pay the same entry cost, which might not be true
in reality. As Buera et al. (2009) has shown, allowing entry costs vary across sectors can
generate large quantitative eects on income and TFP. Similarly, the interaction between
nancial frictions and sectoral or industrial entry costs may also be worth studying. We
leave this for future research.
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23Table 1: Parameter Values
Parameter rb   
   zmax fe f a 
Value 4% 0.96 0.267 0.533 0.0715 0.1 45.6 0.146 8 0.06 0.8
Table 2: Targets
Statistics Data Model
Entry cost (% of GDP) 0.73% 0.73%
Average establishment Size 15.65 15.89
% of establishments with
1-4 employees 54.45% 55.98%
5-9 employees 18.92% 23.02%
10-19 employees 12.72% 11.08%
20-49 employees 8.63% 6.31%
50-99 employees 2.94% 1.97%
100-249 employees 1.67% 1.08%
250-499 employees 0.42% 0.33%
500-999 employees 0.16% 0.14%
1000+ employees 0.09% 0.09%
Table 3: Values for 
High Income Middle Income Low Income Poor
Value of  0.49 0.18 0.091 0.052
24Table 4: Parameter Values for Discussion
Parameter  
  zmax fe f a 
 + 
 = 0:85 0.283 0.567 0.0785 17.91 0.083 4 0.02 0.59
 + 
 = 0:9 0.3 0.6 0.0854 6.21 0.0379 1.04 -0.1 0.385
 = 0:2 0.2 0.6 0.0436 45.67 0.106 6 0.06 0.801
 = 0:4 0.4 0.4 0.1272 44.76 0.335 20 0.06 0.795
25Figure 1: Without Interaction
Output TFP
Figure 2: With Interaction
Output TFP
26Figure 3: Return to Scale=0.85
Output TFP
27Figure 4: Return to Scale=0.9
Output TFP
28Figure 5: Capital Share=0.2
Output TFP
29Figure 6: Capital Share=0.4
Output TFP
307 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
(i): Since the per period prots and the choice sets for (k;h;s0) are both increasing in z
and s, standard dynamic programming argument can easily show that v(z;s) is increasing
in z and s.









s:t: wh + rkk  g(z;s) + ((1 + rb) + 1)s (7.1)
s
0 = 0;if zkh





   (1 + rb)(wh + rkk   s)   f;otherwise:
Since the per period payo zkh
 (1+rb)(wh+rkk) f+((1+rb) 1)s0 and the choice sets
for (k;h;s0) are increasing in s, it is easy to show that g(z;s) is increasing in s by applying
the standard dynamic programming analysis to the above problem.
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